A review of the state of the art in privacy and security in the eHealth cloud by Sahi, Aqeel et al.
Received June 24, 2021, accepted July 6, 2021, date of publication July 20, 2021, date of current version July 30, 2021.
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ACCESS.2021.3098708
A Review of the State of the Art in Privacy
and Security in the eHealth Cloud
AQEEL SAHI , DAVID LAI, AND YAN LI , (Member, IEEE)
University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, QLD 4350, Australia
Corresponding author: Aqeel Sahi (u1050771@usq.edu.au)
This work was supported by the University of Southern Queensland.
ABSTRACT The proliferation and usefulness of cloud computing in eHealth demands high levels of
security and privacy for health records. However, eHealth clouds pose serious security and privacy concerns
for sensitive health data. Therefore, practical and effective methods for security and privacy management
are essential to preserve the privacy and security of the data. To review the current research directions
in security and privacy in eHealth clouds, this study has analysed and summarized the state of the art
technologies and approaches reported in security and privacy in the eHealth cloud. An extensive review
covering 132 studies from several peer-reviewed databases such as IEEEXplore was conducted. The relevant
studies were reviewed and summarized in terms of their benefits and risks. This study also compares several
research works in the domain of data security requirements. This paper will provide eHealth stakeholders
and researchers with extensive knowledge and information on current research trends in the areas of privacy
and security.
INDEX TERMS Cloud security, cloud privacy, eHealth cloud.
I. INTRODUCTION
The official definition of cloud computing, according to
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
is: cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of
configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers,
storage, applications and services) that can be rapidly pro-
visioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction [1]. Over the last decade, cloud
computing has gained popularity within the health sector,
as it offers several advantages such as low costs and flexible
processes [2]. Cloud-based health services allow physicians,
patients, and owners of health data (health departments or
health organizations) to control and share their data easily.
However, eHealth cloud computing poses a range of chal-
lenges, such as data security and privacy for both clients
and cloud service providers (CSPs) [3]–[5]. Security and
privacy issues undermine confidence in an open network
and semi-trusted servers which may lose, leak, or disclose
data [6]. These can allow breaches in users’ privacy when
sharing data in a public cloud.
A great deal of research has been done to target the security
and privacy issues associated with eHealth clouds, and many
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solutions have been suggested. To obtain a clear picture of the
security and privacy problems that can affect eHealth clouds,
this study has reviewed and summarized the current state of
the art in eHealth security and privacy studies from the year
of 2013 to 2021. The aim of this study is to deliver a clear
and complete picture of eHealth security and privacy issues
and their proposed solutions through reviewing the relevant
recent research studies. As shown in Figure 1, we divide
our literature study into five main categories: security and
privacy, security controls, effective encryption, data security
requirements, and disaster recovery plans.
Although cloud computing is widely used in the health
sector, numerous issues remain unresolved [7]–[10]. Sev-
eral studies have been reported to review the research work
in security and privacy in eHealth clouds [4], [11]–[14].
However, some of these studies are now rather outdated,
and others do not cover certain vital aspects such as access
control, revocation and data recovery plans, in cloud security
and privacy. In addition, some of the existing review papers
focus on either the privacy of the cloud or the security of the
cloud, but not both. In this paper we reviewmost of the recent
studies in both security and privacy areas.
A. REVIEW PAPERS SELECTION
In this research, the review papers were collected from
research databases and search engines, including IEEE
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FIGURE 1. Security and privacy literature taxonomy for the eHealth cloud research.
Xplore, Springer, Elsevier Science Direct, and Google
Scholar. Those databases contain large amounts of studies
from journals and conferences that are relevant to security
and privacy in eHealth clouds. The review papers were
selected from the period of 2013 to 2021, with some excep-
tions such as very well-known older articles that couldn’t
be ignored, such as [15]. We used search terms such as
‘‘eHealth cloud security and privacy’’, ‘‘eHealth cloud access
control’’, ‘‘eHealth cloud encryption’’, ‘‘eHealth cloud secu-
rity requirements’’, and ‘‘eHealth cloud recovery plans’’.
The function words AND, OR, and NOT were also used to
perform advanced searches, such as ‘‘eHealth cloud revo-
cation’’ AND (‘‘integrity’’ OR ‘‘access control’’). Finally,
we reviewed the selected papers according to their titles,
abstracts, keywords and conclusions to include the most
relevant papers and to exclude irrelevant ones from the study.
Figure 2 shows the inclusion and exclusion processes, and
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the selected articles over
the years.
The key contributions of this study are as follows: we con-
ducted an extensive literature review, and summaries the state
of the art in eHealth security and privacy schemes.We classify
the papers into five categories, as shown in Figure 1. We dis-
cuss the advantages and limitations covered in the reviewed
papers to facilitate better security and privacy in eHealth
clouds. This study will benefit eHealth decision makers and
researchers with advanced knowledge and information on
current research trends in the areas of privacy and security
to make better-informed decisions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows, using
a structure similar to that of Figure 1. Section 2 describes the
proposed schemes with regard to the security and privacy of
eHealth clouds. Section 3 describes the proposed schemes
with regard to security controls. Section 4 describes effec-
tive encryption of eHealth clouds. Section 5 discusses the
data security requirements of the eHealth cloud. Section 6
describes disaster recovery plans, and Section 7 concludes
this study.
II. KEY SECURITY AND PRIVACY ASPECTS IN THE CLOUD
Cloud computing is a model commonly used to save money
and effort in many sectors, and particularly in the health
sector. However, despite the benefits of eHealth clouds, there
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FIGURE 2. The inclusion/exclusion process.
FIGURE 3. Distribution of the selected articles by year.
are many unresolved issues regarding security and privacy
which require a great deal of research to be resolved [16].
A. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
An Identity Management System (IMS) is a comprehensive
organizational system used to identify entities in a cloud
project. Access to information and resources in the project
is managed by linking client privileges and constraints with
a proven identity. The main aim of an IMS is to determine
what clients can do within a cloud project and under what
conditions [17]. In addition, an IMS is utilized to improve
the security and privacy of a cloud system, and to reduce
the running costs and effort. Many studies have reported on
identity management [15], [18]–[26].
To manage the access to data and resources, cloud ser-
vice providers (CSPs) use either their own IMS (such as
CloudID [18]), or incorporate the client’s IMS into their
infrastructure [18], for example using a biometric-based IMS
to preserve the privacy of the cloud project’s information [18].
A biometric-based IMS is used to connect the private data of
the clients to their biometrics, which are saved as ciphertexts.
To ensure that the CSPs or any possible attackers cannot
obtain any type of access to private information, the proposed
biometric-based IMS is implemented in an encrypted domain
using a searchable cryptographic system.
In 2017 Wang et al. proposed a cost-effective secure
eHealth cloud system using an Identity Based Encryp-
tion (IBE) method [19]. In that system, there are four parties
with different roles: the cloud, the health community, physi-
cians, and patients. The system works as follows. Firstly,
the system sets up public and private keys for all parties
according to their published identities (e.g. email addresses).
Those identities are considered public keys, and are used
to generate private keys using an IBE algorithm. Secondly,
the Electronic Health Records (EHRs) are encrypted by
the parties using a block cipher algorithm such as AES,
and the keys are encrypted using the IBE and sent to the
cloud. Following that, the parties can receive the encrypted
EHRs from the cloud, and decrypt them using their identity
keys.
According to a survey conducted in [20], more than 66% of
users’ identities are stored in unsafe places. Khalil et al. [20],
therefore, proposed an IMS system called the Consolidated
Identity Management (CIDM) system, which they claimed
was resistant to certain attacks such as server compromise
attacks, mobile device compromise attacks, and traffic inter-
ception attacks [20]. The CIDM structure was a public key
cryptosystem. It split permission identifications and spread
them between the parties at the IMS to prevent traffic inter-
ception attacks. In order to mitigate mobile device compro-
mise attacks, a challenge-response approach was adopted.
Finally, the security of the communication channels between
the CIDM and the CSPs was addressed to reduce the
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possibility of any effective compromise of that channel [20].
However, further investigation is required to resolve the prob-
lem of insufficiently dynamic federated identities and privacy
in most current IMS systems [21]. This is an architectural
problem and must be considered at the design level.
Haufe et al. proposed a framework named the Informa-
tion Security Management System (ISMS) [22], consisting
of many vital security procedures for eHealth clouds. The
proposed security management framework was implemented
based on the ISO 27000 family of standards. The ISMS was
able to identify the most frequent cloud computing threats
and the information they aimed to collect were from the
cloud system [22]. One drawback is that the ISMS needs spe-
cific details from processes, such as input, output, and inter-
faces, to facilitate communication and interaction between
processes.
In a different study, the concept of Identity Management
as a Service (IDaaS) was discussed [23]. In that work,
the authors proposed an IMS called BlindIdM which pre-
served the privacy of data and delivered them as IDaaS.
Specifically, the authors described how a system based on the
SecurityAssertionMarkup Language (SMAL)was employed
with proxy encryption to enhance the security of the cloud
projects with respect to the CSPs [23]. To improve the pro-
posed system, extending the IDaaS from a single domain to a
cross-domain approach has been suggested, as in the System
for Cross-domain Identity Management (SCIM) [24], [25].
Xiong et al. proposed a scheme named Privacy Reserving
Identity and Access Management (PRIAM) [26] that has five
components of registration, token withdrawal, tenant pre-
authorization, access control, and token spending. PRIAM
is described as being able to fulfill all the requirements of
cloud security. The proposed scheme used a hash function,
signature, and mutual authentication to ensure the privacy
of clients. In order to deliver the secured access control for
clients andCSP, it utilized a service-level agreement. Burrows
Abadi Needham (BAN) logic was finally used to confirm the
correctness of the scheme [15].
B. PHYSICAL SECURITY
Physical security is the concept of securing and controlling
access to servers, storage, and workstations. In other words,
the aim of physical security is to prevent intruders from
accessing cloud physical facilities [27]. Cloud hardware, such
as servers, switches etc., are also physically secured by the
CSPs from any unusual activities such as attacks, threats, and
floods [28], and is providedwith the necessary power supplies
to reduce any potential interruptions. Typical research was
reported in [28]–[31].
Mxoli et al. showed that to protect Personal Health Records
(PHRs) from any physical intrusion, system hardware must
have a physical security border [29]. For example, physical
access control, offices and rooms must be secured, and resis-
tance against natural disasters and other environmental situ-
ations must be available. All of these security borders must
be in place to ensure that the cloud and network equipment
are not readily accessible to the public. The equipment and
applications used by the CSPs, which may contain PHRs,
must not be moved out of the site or repositioned without the
administrator’s authorization [29].
The IT equipment building, or the site where data cen-
tres and other cloud hardware are located, must be properly
secured. Rodrigues et al. highlighted that these buildings
must be secured by security staff members, video surveillance
systems and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). In addition,
only authorized people should be allowed to enter the
building using authenticated access controls [30].
Carlson stated that CSPs should adopt Federal Information
Security Management Act (FISMA) standards to ensure the
physical security of their records. Since physical entrances to
the physical machines and storage devices are a possible route
for data compromise, FISMA must be implemented at client
sites as well as server sites [31].
C. PRIVACY
CSPs use encryption and other techniques to preserve the
privacy of clients’ critical information, such as credit card
numbers, and only authorized clients have the right to access
this kind of information [32]–[34]. Security is about the
protection of unauthorized data access, while privacy is about
the protection of user identity. The specific differences are,
however, more complex, and there can certainly be areas of
overlap between the two. A lot of research have been done in
eHealth cloud privacy [32], [35]–[44].
Abbas et al. reviewed the state of the art in eHealth cloud
privacy in 2014 [14]. Here, in this study we aim to cover
not only the issues regarding privacy, but also other secu-
rity concerns, such as storage security, access controls, and
disaster recovery plans etc. In this section, we will therefore
first review some of the proposed approaches with regard
to eHealth privacy. Earlier studies on privacy preservation
approaches can be found in Abbas et al.’s paper [14].
A three-factor authentication protocol based on Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) was proposed by Yeh et al.
in 2013 [35]. The protocol had certain disadvantages such
as a vague procedure, impractical IDs, and no shared
key [36]. In addition, the protocol could not prevent spoof-
ing attacks [36]. Another authentication protocol based on a
fingerprint was proposed by Khan et al. [37]. However, this
protocol could not mitigate impersonation or desynchroniza-
tion attacks [36]. To overcome the weaknesses of these proto-
cols, Wu et al. proposed a new biometrics-based three-factor
authentication protocol that can overcome all those draw-
backs as well as ensuring the privacy of clients [36]. This
protocol used the ECC and mobile devices, and adopted
a fuzzy extractor to deal with inadequate biometric inputs.
The protocol proposed by Wu et al. was formally proved
using random oracles and Elliptic Curve Gap Diffie–Hellman
(ECGDH) problem assumption to demonstrate the low prob-
ability of success of these attacks [36]. However, this pro-
tocol is vulnerable to other attacks such as impersonation
and offline password guessing attacks if the mobile device
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falls into the wrong hands. In addition, the user revocation
procedure was not included in that protocol [38]. Therefore,
another three-factor authentication protocol that can resist
these attacks and offers more security features was proposed
by Jiang et al. in 2016 [38].
Yang et al. presented a privacy preservation approach for
health records in eHealth clouds [39]. This approach was
based on the classification of health record attributes. It col-
lected these attributes vertically from the health dataset in
order to ensure that those were collected from all areas of the
dataset with different privacy aspects. Their approach con-
sisted of four steps: (1) vertical data collection, (2) data merg-
ing, (3) integrity checks and (4) plain and cipher text searches.
Cryptography and statistical analysis were combined to
create multiple approaches which can strike a balance
between the use of health records and privacy preserva-
tion [39]. However, this approach did not consider the situ-
ation where several users would use the service at the same
time.
Another scheme proposed by Sahi et al. aimed to pre-
serve the privacy of the PHRs [40]. This scheme adopted a
three-party password-based authenticated key exchange pro-
tocol (3PAKE) based on the computational Diffie–Hellman
assumption proposed by Khader and Lai [41]. The scheme
used a different generator and primitive root in each session
to ensure that only the specific client has complete access to
his/her PHR and clients are revoked at the end of the session.
This can ensure that old session keys cannot be used to access
a client’s PHRs. A disaster recovery plan and a break-glass
technique are also addressed in that scheme.
According toWang et al., cryptography can be very expen-
sive when it is used to preserve the privacy of health records
in the cloud [42]. As a result, they proposed a privacy pre-
serving scheme that transferred sensitive health information
to a trusted private cloud and the remaining non-sensitive part
to a public one. Two protocols were involved in the scheme.
The first was used to preserve the privacy of the clients, and
the second was used to resist any potential collusion between
user records and the public CSPs. To ensure the privacy of
sensitive information, the dataset was divided into several
parts. The fragmented information was distributed among
clouds and could be re-joined [42].
Based on the HireSome-I method, an improved history
record-based service optimizationmethod (HireSome-II) was
proposed by Dou et al. in 2015 [43]. HireSome-II was pro-
posed to ensure the privacy of big data such as health records
in cloud computing. The cloud rejects requests that can reveal
transaction information for privacy reasons, and the proposed
method can efficiently support the cloud service structure to
complete transactions securely [43].
Another framework to ensure the privacy of patient data
was proposed by Page et al. [44]. This framework com-
bined monitoring and analytic methods to deliver secure and
authenticated health records. This framework was based on
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). However, FHE was
known as a slow technique. To measure the practicality of
the proposed framework, therefore, the authors developed a
proof of concept and prototype system [44].
III. CLOUD SECURITY CONTROLS
Security approaches are effective in cloud environments
when an excellent protection mechanism is adopted. This
mechanism must identify the potential problems that may
arise during the management process. These problems are
addressed and considered by security controls, thus preserv-
ing the security of the system from its own weaknesses
and reducing the number of attacks [11], [45]. There are
many cloud security controls which can be categorized as
follows [46]–[61].
A. DETERRENT CONTROLS
Deterrent controls aim to reduce the number of attacks on
a cloud project. A ‘‘No Trespassing’’ sign can alert security
personnel towatch out for intruders aswell as highlighting the
consequences of intrusion. Deterrent controls serve to warn
attackers that there will be penalties and punishments if they
proceed with attacks [46], [47].
B. PREVENTIVE CONTROLS
Preventive controls aim to secure cloud projects by prevent-
ing or decreasing vulnerabilities. For example, an effective
authentication protocol can ensure the security of the cloud’s
clients and prevent any unauthorized access to that cloud.
Preventive controls can, therefore, help the cloud system to
confidently identify its clients [46], [47]. A preventive control
could be writing a piece of code that disables inactive ports
to ensure that there are no available entry points for hackers.
Maintaining a strong user authentication system is another
way of reducing vulnerability to attack.
C. DETECTIVE CONTROLS
Detective controls aim to detect and respond appropriately
to attacks which could threaten the cloud system. During an
attack, the detective control will notify the preventive control
or the corrective control to report the problem. An intru-
sion detection system (IDS) is typically used as a detective
control [2], [3].
D. CORRECTIVE CONTROLS
Corrective controls aim to reduce the damage of an attack.
These controls are usually initiated during or after attacks.
Restoring a cloud system from a backup to ensure the
availability of services is an example of a corrective
control [46], [47].
Generally, access controls are linked to security policies
delivered to clients while accessing the service [62], [63].
A company typically has its own security controls which
allow staff members access to a set of data rather than giving
them full data access. This control limits the access of a staff
member to a particular group of data. These kinds of security
controls need to be put in place in cloud projects to avoid
unauthorized access. The Software as a Service (SaaS) model
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must be sufficiently elastic to combine the set of controls
offered by the company [48].
Recently, much research has been done on cloud security
controls. We discuss some of these studies in the following
paragraphs.
Many stakeholders attempt to access PHRs without autho-
rization. Access control is therefore a major problem for the
privacy of data when health records are stored and shared
in the cloud. Thus, a dynamic access control is necessary to
ensure the privacy of the stored health records. Son et al. [49]
propose a dynamic access control scheme for securing the
privacy of the PHRs in cloud projects [49]. Their scheme
can detect unauthorized access dynamically by altering the
context information, meaning that even if the subject has
the same role, access authorization will not be defined in
the same way, according to the conditions and the context
information. The proposed schemewas tested using a real-life
health system.
Tong et al. proposed an access control architecture which
was designed to ensure the privacy of data [50]. The proposed
architecture has several features, including key exchange,
storage data privacy, emergency retrieval, and auditability to
overcome any misuse of health records. A pseudorandom
number generator was used as a key exchange to ensure
unlinkability, and a redundancy-based secure indexing fea-
turewas proposed to preserve the privacy of the data by hiding
the search and access patterns. Finally, in order to mitigate
any potential misbehaviour, an attribute-based encryption
was integratedwith threshold signing to be used in emergency
and normal situations as an access control with auditability.
Based on a two-stage keyed access control and a zero-
knowledge protocol, Kahani et al. proposed a security control
method [49]. Their method aimed to facilitate access control
and authentication in electronic health cloud systems. When
a user requests access to a health record, a limited amount
of access is allowed based on the user’s rights. To connect
two parties in the system securely, two-stage key manage-
ment is used. This two-stage key management is a combi-
nation of public key encryption and Derived Unique Key Per
Transaction (DUKPT)
Fernando et al. proposed an approach that aimed to reduce
leaks of patient information using unlinkability [52]. Their
approach provided the health data owner with the ability to
make decisions in terms of access control. To fulfill the poli-
cies of the service provider, the proposed approach utilized
a personal information management protocol which could
improve the privacy of the patients. This approach depended
on a scenario in which patient EHRs were stored on a Health
Information Exchange (HIE) cloud service. The approach
demonstrated the communication techniques between EHR
consumers, EHR owners, EHR creators, and the HIE service.
The authors claimed that the privacy of the EHR was ensured
by the unlinkability of consumers’ sessions with the HIE
service. In addition, the HIE service could not reach the
consumer classes even when they had access policies. The
proposed approach works as follows. A patient consults a
doctor and the doctor prescribes a medical test. The patient
goes to a laboratory with the doctor’s instructions, and the
laboratory carries out the test. The results of the test are sent
by the laboratory to the HIE. Finally, the patient provides
access to the doctor and the HIE [52].
In 2015, Wand et al. proposed a scheme called
Constant-Size Ciphertext Policy Comparative Attribute-
Based Encryption (CCP-CABE). This method inserts similar
characteristics from all attributes into a key, and combines
the restrictions of these attributes into a single chunk of a
ciphertext. The procedure is carried out during the encryption
process to apply flexible access control rules with a variety
of relationships. The authors showed that the CCP-CABE
scheme was efficient, as it produced keys and ciphertexts of
the same size each time for any number of attributes, as well
as reducing the cost of the computation to a trivial amount.
To ensure access privacy, the authors extended CCP-CABE
to different attribute domains [53].
Younis et al. proposed a model named Access Control for
CloudComputing (AC3) [54]. Themodel utilized the role and
task principles, and used clients’ jobs as a categorizing factor.
Based on clients’ job roles, security domains are created to
restrict each client to a particular security domain. Each role
within the AC3 is given a group of related and required tasks
for performing those roles. For access to data and resources,
security classification is done for each task, and an authentic
permission is required to complete the task. The authors
employed a risk engine to interact with unpredictable client
behaviours. However, an authentication protocol that can deal
with massive storage complexity and high performance is
required.
In 2014, Yang and Jia proposed a multi-authority access
control scheme [55]. In that scheme, the authors presented
a Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE)
scheme. It was an extension to a single-authority scheme
proposed by Lewko andWaters in [56]. Yang and Jia adopted
Chase’s multi-authority scheme [57] in which all generated
secret keys were combined together for the same client.
CP-ABE also used a revocable scheme and could mitigate
collusion attacks. More specifically, the functionality of a
single authority was divided into a certificate authority and
multiple attribute authorities.
Li et al. adopted Semantic-Based Access Control (SBAC)
techniques to propose an architecture called IntercroSsed
Secure Big Multimedia Model (2SBM) for securing accesses
between different cloud systems [58]. In addition, the 2SBM
architecture can be summarized in three steps:
• To relate attributes to each other, the proposed architec-
ture formats the data by linking the attributes in a matrix;
• Based on their relationships, the architecture creates
interrelations between attributes in the matrix; and
• To improve the efficiency of access control, the archi-
tecture builds a tree of attributes and sorts the attributes
according to their frequency.
Choi et al proposed an ontology-based Access Control
Model (Onto-ACM) in 2014 [59]. Onto-ACM is a model
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of analysis which recognizes and presents the differences
between providers and clients. Based on ontology cognitive
and context-aware technologies, the proposed model can
decide whether data access would be allowed. The model can
be considered as a detailed access control, which can be used
to establish cloud feature boundaries.
Yu et al. proposed a scheme that claimed to achieve
secure, scalable, and fine-grained access policies for cloud
projects [60]. The proposed scheme used an attribute-based
encryption (ABE), proxy re-encryption (PRE), and lazy re-
encryption. Specifically, it allows the data owner to pass the
operations of computation to the servers without revealing
the original data. In that scheme, the data owner is therefore
responsible for the accessibility of the data, which is particu-
larly suitable for cloud projects.
Ruj et al. proposed a different form of access control
in 2014 [61]. There are three types of clients: creator, reader,
and writer in their method. For example, Alice is the client
and a trusted party gives her a token (general feature). The
trusted party could be any government office controlling
health records. When submitting a claim, Alice presents her
identification (e.g., a health card), and the trusted party pro-
vides her with the token. In this scheme, there are two key
distribution centres (KDCs) which are responsible for dis-
tributing the keys to the clients. Based on the information in
the token and the keys from one or two of the KDCs, a creator
makes a decision on the claim, ensuring the identity of Alice
and authenticating and encrypting the messages under this
claim. The signed ciphertext is then sent to the cloud. The
cloud system authenticates the signature of the ciphertext and
keeps it on the cloud servers. When the reader requests to
read a message, the cloud system will send the ciphertext.
Without the appropriate keys, the user will not be able to
retrieve the plaintext; however, the access control manager
has full access to all client information and can decrypt the
ciphertexts.
IV. EFFECTIVE ENCRYPTION
Several advanced encryption algorithms have been reported
in cloud computing research to protect the security and pri-
vacy of eHealth data. Encryption schemes such as public
key encryption (PKE) and symmetric key encryption (SKE)
have been frequently used to protect data in eHealth cloud
projects [14], [64]–[66]. Other encryption schemes are also
used to ensure the security and privacy of eHealth records
including attribute-based encryption (ABE), fully homomor-
phic encryption (FHE), and searchable encryption (SE).
A. ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS
The first ABE algorithmswere presented by Sahai andWaters
in 2005 [67], and by Goyal et al. in 2006 [68].
ABE is a type of PKE where the ciphertext and shared key
of a client depend on attributes. In ABE systems, retrieving a
plaintext from ciphertext is applicable for clients who have a
group of key attributes that match ciphertext attributes. One
of the most important features of the ABE system is that it
is collusion resistant. An attacker who has many keys can
only access the system when at least one key has an approved
access. Many researchers have proposed various ABE algo-
rithms. Some of which are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Fabian et al. proposed an ABE-based scheme for secure
data sharing in eHealth clouds [69]. The proposed scheme
aimed to preserve the security and privacy of patients’ records
in partly trustworthy cloud servers. It uses the ABE algorithm
to manage users’ accessibility to health records and shared
keys, and to distribute information and health records among
several clouds. If a patient visiting three different Health
Centres (HCs), such as HC A, HC B and HC C. His/her
health record is updated at each of the three centres. When
a patient visits HC C, the doctors at HC C can request the
full health record for that patient from HCs A and B through
themulti-cloud proxy. However, the keymanagement process
needs to be reconsidered and solved. In addition, the key
authority of the ABE algorithm has to be distributed, and
security responsibilities must be separated.
Li et al. proposed an ABE-based framework for secure
sharing of PHRs in eHealth clouds [2]. The authors assumed
that the cloud servers were semi-trusted, and they also argued
that the PHR records had to be encrypted to ensure the
privacy of the patients. They used the ABE algorithm to
encrypt PHRs, and patients can delegate others from public
domains to access their PHR records. Their work involved
verifying key management complexity reduction and privacy
enhancement. The proposed framework involves multiple
data owners, clients, attribute authorities (AAs), and SDs. The
framework can use one of two ABE algorithms: the revoca-
ble key policy ABE system proposed by Yu et al for each
public and personal domain (PSD) [60], and their own revo-
cable MA-ABE system for each personal and public domain
(PUD) [2].
Outsourced ABE (OABE) approaches can significantly
decrease the computational cost of encryption by moving
large computation to a CSPs. However, large encrypted files
which are saved on the cloud are likely to affect query pro-
cessing in a negative way. Li et al., therefore, proposed a
keyword search function (KSF-OABE) approach that aimed
to solve the problem [70]. KSF-OABE offers key issu-
ing, decryption and keyword search functions. It retrieves
part of the ciphertext according to a particular keyword.
In that approach, operations that consume a large amount
of time will be moved to the CSPs, while users who need
less processing time would go ahead with their operations.
Thus, the processing time can be reduced on both the
CSPs and user sides. However, the proposed KSF-OABE
approach does not offer verifiability features. The proposed
approach was tested only for a replayable chosen-ciphertext
attack (RCCA) and was not tested for a chosen-ciphertext
attack (CCA). CCA-secure approaches are RCCA-secure,
although RCCA-secure approaches are not CCA-secure.
Therefore, testing under both CCA and RCCA conditions is
suggested.
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A PHR system based on the ABE algorithm was presented
by Xhafa et al. for secure sharing and storing of PHRs
in the cloud [71]. The system permits users to share their
PHRs and personal information selectively with health ser-
vice providers. The proposed system is practical as it provides
searchability, revocation, and local decryption. Based on their
operations, ABEs can be classified as ciphertext-policy or
key-policy ABEs.
1) CIPHERTEXT-POLICY ABES
In the ciphertext-policy (CP-ABE) approaches, the encryp-
tor normally manages the access operation. The public key
process is more complex due to the complexity of the
access operation and tightens the system [72]. Most CP-ABE
research concentrates on the access control design [73].
Liu et al. proposed an approach based on CP-ABE with a
signature (SignCryption), called CP-ABSC. It delivers PHR
authentication, encryption, and access control [74]. The pro-
posed approach permits a patient to sign the PHR record using
a secret key and a group of personal attributes. CP-ABSC
has two features: access control and signature encryption
(SignCryption). The authors claim that a combination of these
two features could deliver the authenticity, unforgeability,
confidentiality and collusion prevention required by a PHR
system. However, a revocation process was not considered.
In addition, according to Rao [75], that approach couldn’t
provide verifiability for a public ciphertext property, which is
necessary to resist any invalid ciphertext decryption in order
to decrease the redundant load on the decryptor [75].
As a result, in 2017, Rao proposed another CP-ABSC
approach for PHR cloud projects, which claimed to be ver-
ifiable for a public ciphertext [75]. Their approach satisfies
the important security properties of the attribute-based sig-
nature (ABS) and ABE. Furthermore, it uses communication
links to a lesser extent than other approaches. The CP-ABSC
has two assumptions: existential unforgeability in selec-
tive signing predicate and adaptive chosen message attack
(EUF-sSP-CMA) and the resistance of the computational
Diffie–Hellman Exponent (cDHE) problem, and decisional
Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Exponent (dBDHE) problem [75].
Those assumptions can prevent the ‘‘indistinguishability of
ciphertext in selective encryption predicate and adaptive
chosen ciphertext’’ attack (IND-sEP-CCA2).
Wang et al. [76] introduced another cloud-based PHR
(CB-PHR) system. CB-PHR permits the owners of PHRs to
safely store their records in a partly trustworthy CSPs, and to
share them with several clients of their choice. PHR clients
were divided into public and personal domains to decrease
the complexity of key management. In their approach, health
records are encrypted by the owner of the PHRs using
CP-ABE for presentation to the public domain, whereas
health records are encrypted using a nameless multi-receiver
identity-based encryption algorithm for the personal domain.
Therefore, only accredited clients whose identification can
meet the CP specifications can decrypt health records [76].
It should be mentioned that the CB-PHR has a high compu-
tational cost, as it encrypts the same record twice.
Motivated by cloud security requirements, Xu et al. modi-
fied the CP-ABE scheme to propose a Verifiable Delegation
CP-ABE (VDCPABE) [77]. The cloud computing scheme
is based on verifiable technology and multilinear maps.
Hybrid encryption is used to encrypt data by its owner. For
each ciphertext block, a verifiable message authentication
code (MAC) is generated privately, and the full ciphertext
is then uploaded to the cloud. When the data owner is not
online, the client who requested the data can ask the cloud
server directly [77].
Health records are usually represented using a multilayer
hierarchical structure. However, according to Wang et al.,
this hierarchical characteristic of health records has not been
investigated thoroughly in terms of CP-ABE [78]. As a result,
they propose a data hierarchy ABE approach for such cloud
projects. They use a single access control method rather than
levelled access control methods, and the hierarchical data
are encrypted using a single access control method. As the
parts of the ciphertext which were related to attributes were
distributed by the records, the proposed scheme was shown
to reduce storage and time costs [78].
A PHR privacy preserving approach based on a multi-
authority CP-ABE which offers revocation features and
ensures fine-grained access was proposed by Qian et al. [79].
The authors report that their approach can be implemented
in a partly trustworthy server and encrypted PHRs with
multiple owners can be stored on that server. The proposed
approach was able to work in public cloud PHR systems [2].
Once PHRs encryption is complete, to achieve a fine-grained
access, a patient can combine ciphertext with multilayer
access attributes. A key exchange scheme was used to pre-
serve the privacy of the PHRs. This key exchange scheme
ensured that if cracked, authorities would expose zero infor-
mation regarding the client’s global identifier (GId). As a
result, the tracing of a GId by an attacker yielded no infor-
mation about the client’s attributes. The revocation of lazy
client and on-demand services are features provided by this
approach that decrease the computational overhead [79].
An approach based on CP-ABEwas proposed byGuo et al.
to secure EHRs in health cloud environments [80]. The
approach uses a CP-ABE algorithm to encrypt tables pub-
lished by healthcare providers, such as EHRs. The patient’s
identification number is used as a primary key to store these
records in a database. It permits multiple clients with multiple
constraints to search multiple database columns. The authors
highlighted that their work differed from others in terms of
securing outsourcing records, as the search management of
columns in the database was emphasized [80].
Xhafa et al. presented a multi-authority CP-ABE approach
with a patient accountability feature to secure PHR sharing
in a health cloud project [81]. In the proposed work, patient
privacy was secured by hiding the access control policy.
The reduction of authority and PHRs trust assumptions were
ensured through the accountability feature.
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2) KEY-POLICY ABE
In the Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE)
schemes, ciphertext has a group of attributes, and the
access regulations are controlled by the client’s private key.
Ciphertext can be decrypted only when these groups of
attributes match the structure of access to the client’s private
key [82], [83].
Based on the Decisional Bilinear Deffie-Hellman (DBDH)
assumption, a privacy-preserving KP-ABE (PP KP-ABE)
approach was proposed for secure data sharing in a cloud
system [84]. This approach permits clients to retrieve data
from the cloud and then decrypt it, without exposing any
attribute information to a third party. The issue of collusion
attacks has been resolved in that research, as PP KP-ABE is
collusion resistant. The authors of PP KP-ABE utilized a key
management scheme to strengthen the connection between
the client and the secret key. Thus, multiple clients cannot use
their secret keys to produce a secret key for an unapproved
client [84].
Another KP-ABE-based scheme named access policy
re-definable ABE (APR-ABE) was proposed by Qin et al.
for securing EHRs in cloud environments [85]. In APR-ABE,
attribute vectors were used to implement access control. This
access control was linked to clients’ secret keys. Higher
level clients can easily redefine their access control to be
commensurate with their roles, and can then provide lower
level clients with a secret key that has more limitations.
B. FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION (FHE)
The FHE is a type of encryption that has a special feature
permitting operations to be done on a ciphertext as well as
on plaintext [86], [91]. The feature is important, especially
for the modern ICT systems as it enables the possibility of
chaining several services together without leaking informa-
tion. There are several schemes which secure health records
using the FHE, and we discuss some of these in the following
paragraphs.
An FHE-based scheme was proposed to secure computa-
tions for the Genome-Wide Association Study (GWAS) [87].
The proposed scheme aimed to preserve the privacy of
patients’ genomic data. It adapts the FHE to encrypt genotype
and phenotype data for all patients to implement meaning-
ful operations on a ciphertext. However, the authors do not
consider the computational complexity of the FHE in their
proposed scheme, which was a major issue for the proposed
FHE scheme [88].
A different approach based on the FHE was proposed to
preserve the privacy of health data in a public cloud [89], [90].
A detailed analysis was provided based on heart rate (aver-
age), heart rate (max/min), and the automated detection of
irregular heartbeats. The authors provided a set of experimen-
tal results over 24 hours using an electrocardiogram (ECG)
signal dataset and a homomorphic encryption library (HElib).
The results showed that the proposed approach could be
adapted for a health cloud system to secure data from those
issues [89], [90]. However, the proposed scheme does not
solve the problem of computational complexity in the FHE.
The implementation of that approach in a real-time parallel
system also needs to be considered to reduce the processing
time.
Zhao et al. proposed a different FHE-based system to solve
the issue of lack of data safety in a health cloud [92]. The
authors claimed that the proposed method was suitable for
both retrieving and processing ciphertext for a secure storage
of health data on cloud servers and the transmission of data
between the cloud and the clients. The method was able to
offer search date for a third party. However, in the same way
as the previous methods, this method also suffers from high
computation requirements.
C. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION (SE)
SE is a cryptographic scheme that provides safe search
in a ciphertext. For enhanced effectiveness [93], SE typi-
cally constructs keyword indexes to verify client requests.
SE schemes can be based either on a public key or secret
key. Many proposals have been investigated to deliver secure
search over encrypted text, and some of these are described
below [94]–[100].
Yang andMa proposed a time-dependent SE approachwith
a designated tester and timing enabled proxy re-encryption
function (Re-dtPECK) [94]. The approach allowed patients
to give limited access privileges to others, which helps con-
trol search procedures over the health records within a cer-
tain timeframe. People who are given access privileges by
patients can search and decrypt health records within this
limited timeframe. In addition, Re-dtPECK offers a linked
word search, and can prevent guessing attacks [94]. However,
the revocation feature is not considered in this approach,
as the patient holds the same key most of the time, meaning
that Re-dtPECK needs to consider redistributing secret keys
among authorized clients.
A scheme named secure channel-free searchable encryp-
tion (SCF-PEKS) has been proposed to offer a secure search
over encrypted EHR [95]. This version of SCF-PEKS was
shown to be able to reduce storage and computational
costs when compared to the previous SCF-PEKS. Moreover,
it could resist keyword guessing attacks. However, despite
reductions in storage and computational costs, ranked and
fuzzy keyword searches were not provided, and integrity
checks were missing.
Another proposed scheme uses a Bloom filter tree index to
permit accredited users to retrieve data from ciphertext in a
cloud [96]. In addition to the proposed scheme, the authors
introduced a ranking method based on keyword membership,
to retrieve only vital keywords. The authors argued that their
work was the first to be able to retrieve fully encrypted text
from a large cloud storage database. However, a collusion
attack could possibly threaten the proposed scheme.
Liu et al. proposed a novel EHR cloud project which
aimed to safely share and store EHR records in a cloud
environment [97]. The proposed approach is based on binary
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trees for saving EHR ciphertext, and the ABE algorithm
was adopted for efficient encryption of the shared keys. The
authors claimed that the proposed project was designed to
secure EHRs, and these were encrypted using a symmetric
algorithm. With fewer cryptographic operations, a search-
able encryption scheme might improve the system further.
However, integrity checks were not offered by the proposed
system.
Since the security of data sharing is an important factor
for any cloud-based system, especially health cloud systems,
Liang and Susilo defined a notation searchable attribute-
based proxy re-encryption (ABPRE) scheme to address the
issue [98]. However, the authors did not state how they might
reduce the search token size, and how a key holder could cre-
ate tokens. A modified scheme was recommended to address
the issues.
In addition, Li et al. introduced two fine-grained multi-
keyword search (FMS) schemes, FMS_I and FMS_II [99].
FMS_I was designed to provide an accurate search by consid-
ering common keyword factors and related scores. FMS_II
was built to offer a secure complex search, which might
contain several keywords connected with logical operations
such as ‘‘AND’’ and ‘‘OR’’ operations. Finally, to enhance
the efficiency of the proposed schemes, FMS classified sup-
port (FMSCS) sub-dictionaries were proposed. However, the
proposed method cannot deal with a multi-user cloud.
Finally, a multi-keyword SE method was proposed to
safely search over encrypted text on a cloud [100]. This
method was able to offer dynamic operations such as insert
and delete operations. The authors designed their own
tree-based index, as well as a ‘‘greedy depth-first search’’
method to enhance the ranked search using multiple key-
words. They chose the KNN algorithm to encrypt the query
and the index. In addition, the algorithm was chosen to
compute the score of the connections between the query and
the index. Shade terms are inserted into the index to prevent
statistical attacks. However, a revocation feature is not offered
by the proposed approach, as the patient holds the same key
most of the time, as in Re-dtPECK, that was discussed above.
V. DATA SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Several security issues are related to cloud systems, such
as EHR cloud-based systems. The issues include not only
common concerns such as DDoS attacks [101], but also
specific issues in the cloud such as side channel attacks,
etc. [6], [102], [103]. Thus, setting security requirements for
any cloud system is essential and needs to be included in
our review. From an eHealth cloud perspective, the security
requirements (R) of cloud systems are included in Table 1.
Table 2 shows a comparison of security approaches for
eHealth clouds in terms of data security requirements.
VI. DISASTER RECOVERY PLANS
The CSPs should establish continuity and recovery plans to
ensure that services will remain available, and can recover
all lost data even after disasters such as floods, earthquakes,
bushfires, or electricity power failures [121]. The data recov-
ery planmay be established solely by CSPs, or in consultation
with clients.
Several suggestions have been made to facilitate
disaster recovery, and some of these are discussed
below [40], [122], [123].
Sahi et al. developed a disaster recovery plan to ensure the
availability of PHRs and HERs in a health cloud environ-
ment [40]. The authors assumed that a cloud storage consisted
of three or more data centres. Distributing signals called
heartbeats were used between data centres and the CSPs in
order to keep track of the status of these data centres. Each
health record was divided into several parts, and multiple
copies of each part were stored in different data centres. In the
case of a disaster, the heartbeat from a data centre would
stop if the data centre machine was damaged, which would
alert the manager. The manager would recover or retrieve the
records from the other data centres, without accessing access
the damaged one. The authors reported that the data centres
must be physically located in different geographic locations
(for example in different countries) to ensure the availability
of the data and the services [40].
Another disaster recovery plan was proposed based on
three different techniques: TCP/IP, VM snapshots, and repli-
cation [122]. The plan was reported to achieve 99.94% data
recovery in the event of a disaster. The proposed approach
was implemented with real data and was tested with the
backup data from all the sister site records in London,
Southampton, and Leeds. However, the data centres in the
proposed approach were not integrated with any existing
data centres. In addition, all data centres are located within
one country, in the same geographical area, which could be
considered a major drawback.
Gu et al. proposed backup and recovery models for imple-
menting a disaster recovery plan [123]. In terms of the backup
model, clients are provided with accounts with limited rights.
The CSPs is responsible for sending and receiving data
to/from clients. A client is able to request a backup from
the CSPs within a certain timeframe. The CSPs will hold
this request, make three copies of the data and store those
copies in different locations. In the recovery model, the client
can request a data recovery from the CSPs. The CSPs can
retrieve the data from the stored three copies and send it back
to the client. However, storing the data in full at three different
locations can significantly increase the backup data size.
Mansoori et al. presented a disaster recovery plan based
on two servers, a local server and a disaster recovery
server [124]. The proposed plan considers four scenarios to
provide availability and continuity of services. The authors
implemented the proposed plan within a university hospi-
tal health system to ensure constant access to the picture
archiving and communication system (PACS) application and
its controlled radiology images. However, the authors did
not consider a scenario in which a disaster would affect a
relatively wide geographic area leading to damage to the
backup images.
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TABLE 1. Data security requirements.
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TABLE 2. Comparison of security approaches for the eHealth cloud.
Some of the existing review papers focused on either the
privacy of the cloud or the security of the cloud, but not both.
There were few examples of research papers that considered
reviewing security and privacy at the same time within the
health sector such as [66], [125]–[130]. In this paper we have
reviewed most of the recent studies in both security and pri-
vacy areas. To sum up, themain contribution of this study is to
help eHealth decisionmakers and researchers tomake a better
decision by picking up their preferred requirements for: (1)
identity management / physical security / privacy; (2) cloud
security control; (3) encryption; (4) data security, and (5)
disaster recovery. Then, they can start to look for providers
offering services matching the desirable requirements.
VII. CONCLUSION
The security and privacy of health data in the cloud requires
secure solutions that are capable of controlling security and
privacy while keeping all features of eHealth under consid-
eration. In this paper, we review the state of the art on secu-
rity and privacy research in eHealth clouds from five main
perspectives: security and privacy, security controls, effective
encryption, data security requirements, and disaster recovery
plans. This paper, therefore, provides a clear overall picture
for the current security and privacy development in eHealth
to stakeholders in order to facilitate better understanding,
designs and decisions. In summary, this paper reviews, eval-
uates, and classifies the state-of-the-art eHealth security and
privacy schemes. It covers the most recent studies in this
research area, and discusses the benefits and drawbacks of
most important literature to help improve the security and
privacy of eHealth clouds.
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